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THE DEAD MAN'S STATUTE BEFORE AND AFTER THE
FLORIDA EVIDENCE CODE-A STEP IN THE
RIGHT DIRECTION
INTRODUCTION
As a general rule all persons are competent to testify in any
Florida court and before any judicial officer." One major exception
to this rule has long been recognized: parties to an action, or persons
interested in the event of an action, are incompetent to testify against
the estate of a decedent concerning transactions or communications
with the decedent. 2 This exception was formerly embodied in a proviso
of section 90.05, Florida Statutes, commonly known as the Dead Man's
Statute.3 In June 1976, the Florida Legislature enacted the Florida
Evidence Code.4 The Code repealed section 90.05 and replaced it
with two new sections.5 Contrary to the urgings of experts in the
field of evidence, 6 these two sections preserve rather than abolish
the Dead Man's Statute; they do, however, ameliorate the Statute's
effect by limiting its application to oral communications.7
1. FLA. STAT. § 90.05 (1975) provides in part: "No person, in any court, or before
any officer acting judicially, shall be excluded from testifying as a witness by reason
of his interest in the event of the action or proceeding, or because he is a party
thereto .... "
2. FLA. STAT. § 90.05 (1975) provides in part:
[P]rovided, however, that no party to such action or proceeding, nor any person
interested in the event thereof, nor any person from, through or under whom
any such party, or interested person, derives any interest or title, by assignment
or otherwise, shall be examined as a witness in regard to any transaction or
communication between such witness and a person at the time of such examination
deceased, insane or lunatic, against the executor, or administrator, heir at law,
next of kin, assignee, legatee, devisee, or survivor of such deceased person, or
the assignee or committee of such insane person or lunatic; but this prohibition
shall not extend to any transaction or communication as to which any such
executor, administrator, heir at law, next of kin, assignee, legatee, devisee,
survivor, or committeeman shall be examined on his own behalf, or as to which
the testimony of such deceased person or lunatic shall be given in evidence.
3. FLA. STAT. § 90.05 (1975).
4. Fla. Laws 1976, ch. 76-237.
5. Section 90.05 was replaced by Fla. Laws 1976, ch. 76-237, §§ 90.601 and 90.602.
6. M. Ladd, Admission of Evidence Against Estates of Deceased Persons, 19 IOWA L.
REv. 521, 538 (1933-34); M. Ladd, The Dead Man Statute: Some Further Observations
and a Legislative Proposal, 26 IOWA L. REv. 207 (1940-41); 2 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 578
(3d ed. 1940).
7. Fla. Laws 1976, ch. 76-237, § 90.601, provides: "Every person is competent to
be a witness, except as otherwise provided by statute."
Under the provisions of section 90.05 interested persons and parties were incompe-
tent to testify concerning both transactions and communications with the deceased. The
new proviso pertains only to oral communications, removing transactions and nonoral
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The legislature's refusal to abolish the Dead Man's Statute reflects
both a misunderstanding of the historic basis and development of the
Dead Man's Statute and a failure to recognize its obsolescence today.
This note will explore the history and development of the Dead Man's
Statute to determine whether its survival is supportable and examine
the treatment of the rule by Florida courts. It will also briefly review
the treatment that the Dead Man's Statute has received in the Federal
Rules of Evidence, and ways in which other states have resolved the
Dead Man's Statute dilemma.
I. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
Disqualification of witnesses was virtually unknown until the time
of the Tudors, when the jury ceased to give a verdict from its own
knowledge and the modern "fact witness" began to appear.8 Prior to
that time, jury members and witnesses played such interrelated roles
that it was difficult to distinguish their functions.9 Following the
Norman invasion of England, a system of "popular justice" evolved.'0
Popular justice involved the summoning of a number of neighbors
who knew the truth of the matter to be decided.", The courts that
convened to hear these witnesses resembled a "town-meeting of
judges"; these "popular courts" required rigid adherence to forms,
and there were no rational modes of proof.' 2 Popular justice usually
took one of four forms: (1) trial by witnesses; (2) trial by party's
oath; (3) trial by ordeal; or (4) trial by battle.'3 Each of these modes
communications from the scope of the Dead Man's Statute. Fla. Laws 1976, ch. 76-237,
§ 90.602 provides in part:
(1) No person interested in an action or proceeding against the personal
representative, heir-at-law, assignee, legatee, devisee, or survivor of a deceased
person, or against the assignee, committee, or guardian of an insane person, shall
be examined as a witness regarding any oral communication between the interested
person and the person who is deceased or insane at the time of the examination.
8. IX W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw, 178 (3d ed. 1966) (hereinafter
cited as HOLDswoRTH). See also Rowley, The Competency of Witnesses, 24 IowA L. REv.
482 (1939).
It appears that by the 1400's the "modern witness" had begun to take his place
as a witness and not as part of the jury. See J. TAYm, A PELIMIMNAy TREATISE ON
EvIDENCE 120-24 (1898) (hereinafter cited as THAYER); 2 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 575 (3d
ed. 1940) (hereinafter cited as WIGMORE). During the 1400's no disqualification because of
interest appears, but by the 1600's "ideas have plainly changed" and disqualification
because of interest is apparent. Id.
9. See 45-46 CHI.-KENT L. Rav. 36 (1968).
10. THAYER 8.
11. Id. at 7; Rowley, supra note 8, at 486.
12. THAYER 8. Trial by witness is a good example of the use of "forms." The witness
was present to give his oath in a formalistic, set ritual; failure to adhere to the form-the
ritual-quite often meant defeat. Id. at 8-16.
13. Id. at 16.
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of trial, with the exception of trial by ordeal, accepted the interested
witness; indeed, in most cases interest was a prerequisite to witness
competence. 4
Trial by witness involved one-sided proof; there was no cross-
examination, and the oath itself, rather than the probative quality
of what was said, was all important.15 At the time this mode of trial
was at its zenith-approximately the 13th century-certain transactions
required witnesses;' 6 the sworn statement of one of these witnesses
before the popular court settled the matter.
In a case of 1219 ... the defendant alleged the minority of the
plaintiff, the plaintiff replied that he was of full age, and thereof
he put himself on the inspection of the judges, and if they should
doubt about it he would prove it either by his mother and his rela-
tives, or otherwise .... The judges were in doubt, and ordered that
he prove his age by twelve legal men .... [T]he proof "is by twelve
legal men ... some of whom are of the family .... " First, one of
them swears that the party is or is not twenty-one .. . and then
in turn each of the others swears that the oath thus taken is true. 7
In the instant case it is difficult to differentiate the witnesses from the
jurors. Eventually, however, these twelve community witnesses appear
to have evolved into a form of jury. 8 Clearly this mode of trial did
nothing to omit witnesses interested in the suit; to the contrary, the
witnesses were interested partisans.
Trial by oath, a medieval form of trial, involved the use of oath-
helpers-compurgators. 19 These "fellow-swearers" were not witnesses;
they "swore . . . to the truthfulness of another person's oath, or .. .
to their belief of the truth.' ' 20 In this instance it was not necessary that
the compurgators have firsthand knowledge of the facts. 2' They might
have been, and probably were, kinsmen of the party.22 This mode of
trial steadily declined in use and was eventually survived by trial by
jury.23
14. Id.
15. Id. at 17.
16. "Certain transactions, like sales, had to take place before previously appointed
witnesses." Id. Age, death and property in a movable chattel were also provable by
"formal witness-proof." id. at 18.
17. Id. at 19.
18. Id. at 20.
19. Id. at 25.
20. Id.
21. Id. This mode of trial became known as "wager of law." The name was
derived from those giving pledges to appear and give their oath. ld. at 28.
22. Id. at 25.
23. Id. at 28-29.
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Trial by ordeal was convenient whenever other modes of trial were
unavailable.24 Such a trial did not involve witnesses; indeed it may
have been invoked for lack of witnesses.25 Trial by ordeal had its
basis in the belief that God would save the innocent; He would give
24. Id. at 34-36. Thayer summarized an account of the ordeals found in PATETrA,
Ordalie:
After speaking of the situation where there are neither writings nor witnesses, and
of the examination of the defendant, it is said that "If reasonable inference also
leads to no result," the defendant is to be put to the ordeal. "He whom the
blazing fire burns not, whom the water soon forces not up, or who meets with
no speedy misfortune must be held veracious in his testimony on oath. Let ordeals
be administered if an offence has been committed in a solitary forest, at night, in
the interior of a house, and in cases of violence and of denial of a deposit ...
The balance, fire, water, poison, and sacred libation are said to be the five divine
tests for the purgation of suspected persons." Then follows an account of each of
these ordeals. 1. After describing the scales and the first weighing of the accused,
it is said: "And having adjured the balance by imprecations, the judge should
cause the person accused to be placed in the balance again. '0 balance, thou only
knowest what mortals do not comprehend. This man being arraigned in a cause
is weighed upon thee. Therefore mayest thou deliver him lawfully from his
perplexity.' . . . Should the individual increase in weight, he is not innocent; if
he be equal in weight or lighter, his innocence is established." 2. In the ordeal
of fire seven circles with a diameter equal to the length of the man's foot, and
thirty-two inches distant from each other, are marked on the ground. The circles
are smeared with cows' dung, and the man, having fasted and made himself
clean, has seven aqvattha leaves laid on his hands and fastened there, and takes
in his hands a smooth ball of red-hot iron, weighing fifty palas, and walks slowly
through the seven circles. He then puts the ball on the ground. "If he is burnt,
his guilt is proved; but if he remain wholly unburnt, he is undoubtedly
innocent. . . . 'Thou, 0 fire, dwellest in the interior of all creatures, like a
witness. Thou only knowest what mortals do not comprehend. This man is
arraigned in a cause and desires acquittal. Therefore mayest thou deliver him
lawfully from his perplexity.'" 3. In the ordeal of water, the man wades out into
the water up to his navel, and another shoots an arrow. The man dives or ducks
into the water, and if he remains wholly under while a swift runner gets and
fetches back the arrow he is innocent. The adjuration to the water is similar
to the above, in the case of fire and the balance. 4. In the ordeal by poison
elaborate directions are given about the choice of the poison and the time of
year for administering it. The invocation runs: "Thou, 0 poison, art the son of
Brahma, thou art persistent in truth and justice; relieve this man from sin, and
by thy virtue become as ambrosia to him. On account of thy venomous and
dangerous nature thou art the destruction of all living creatures; thou art
destined to show the difference between right and wrong like a witness," etc.,
etc., much as in the other cases above. "If the poison is digested easily, without
violent symptoms, the king shall recognize him as innocent, and dismiss him, after
having honored him with presents." 5. In the ordeal by sacred libation, "the
judge should give the accused water in which an image of that deity to whom
he is devoted has been bathed, thrice calling out the charge with composure. One
to whom any calamity or misfortune happens within a week or a fortnight is
proved to be guilty."
Id. at 35-36.
25. Id. at 36.
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the innocent the strength and ability to endure physical ordeal. 2
Those who successfully undertook the ordeal were deemed innocent;
those who failed were deemed guilty. This mode of trial was short-
lived, lasting about a century and a half after the Norman Conquest.27
Trial by battle was also brought to England by the Normans and
proved to be unpopular with the Anglo-Saxons.2s Where "rude and
unrational" methods of trial failed, battle was frequently resorted to.28
The plaintiff would offer a champion who usually spoke from per-
sonal knowledge. This champion would swear to the truth of his own
testimony and was ready to fight for it.3° The defendant would also
offer a champion to fight for his testimony. Initially it was forbidden
to hire a champion, but eventually the requirement that the champion
be a witness was abandoned and hiring became acceptable."' This sys-
tem of hiring champions worked great hardship on the poor; a rich
man could afford to pay the finest champions, and this put the poor
man at a disadvantage.3 2 The inadequacy of trial by battle played a
large part in the advancement of modern juries. Because of the
hazardous nature and obvious inequities of trial by battle, Henry II
found it necessary to promote a new mode-the jury trial.33
Thus, until the advent of the jury trial in the 15th century,
witnesses were not disqualified from testifying because of interest.-
Indeed, disinterested persons were treated as improper witnesses."
In many instances the witnesses and the jury were indistinguishable,
and frequently juries were chosen from those in the neighborhood
who were familiar with the facts. 6 But as the jury trial became the
accepted judicial procedure, the functions of jury and witnesses
became separated.37 The period between 1500 and 1650 saw a marked
change in attitude toward the witness.38 No longer a member of the
26. See id. at 38.
27. Id. at 38. Thayer states that both trial by ordeal and compurgation are mis-
understood. The ordeal, for example, was a means of giving a culprit a chance of
escaping punishment. The ordeal usually followed the verdict of a jury and was a
means of "clearing one's self of a charge." Id. at 39.
28. Id. at 40.
29. Id. at 41.
30. Id. at 43.
31. See id.
32. Id. at 41.
33. Id.
34. WIGMORE § 575. See also text accompanying notes 17, 20, 21, 22, and 31 supra.
35. WIGMORE § 575.
36. THAYER 100.
37. Id; WIGMORE § 575.
38. WIGMORE § 575.
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jury, the witness became the chief source of information and interest
a basis for disqualificationa
There is evidence that as early as the 12th century, canon law
designated certain persons as incompetent:
[A]Il males under fourteen and females under twelve, of the blind
and the deaf and dumb, of slaves, infamous persons, and those con-
victed of crime, of excommunicated persons, of poor persons and
women in criminal cases, of persons connected with either party by
consanguinity and affinity, or belonging to the household of either
party, of the enemies of either party, and of Jews, heretics and
pagans.4°
Prior to the 15th century, when Henry II began to promote the jury
trial,'4 1 these rules of incompetency were utilized to challenge jurors
as well as witnesses.42 In the following century, the Act of 1562-63
created the statutory offense of perjury and provided for compulsory
attendance of witnesses. This Act marked the begining of an era
characterized by questions involving witness competency.43 The 16th
and 17th centuries saw the advent of a new class of witnesses and new
rules governing competency."
The disqualification of parties because of interest appeared as
early as 1582.45 Under common law rules, four "classes" of witnesses
were incompetent to testify: "(1) Those insensible to the obligation of
an oath; (2) Those wanting in capacity or understanding; (3) Those
having a pecuniary interest in the issue; (4) Parties to the issue .... 46
The rationale for disqualification dates back to the 1400's and trial
by oath or wager of law. In wager of law a party had the benefit
of his own oath,47 as well as the aid of compurgators and others who
might go out with the jury to help them decide.41 This advantage was
not permitted in jury trials.4 9 Jury trial and party's oath could not be
mixed together; a person could not offer both his oath and be a
witness at a jury trial.50 The disqualification of interested persons
39. Id.
40. HOLDSWORTH at 186, quoting SALMOND, ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE; Rowley, supra
note 8, at 488.
41. See text accompanying Note 33 supra.
42. HOLDSWORTH 185.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 186-87; Rowley, supra note 8, at 488.
45. WIGMORE § 575.
46. 5 B. JONES, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 2084 (2d ed. 1926).
47. WIGMORE § 575.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. See WIGMORE § 575.
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followed the disqualification of parties,51 but it did not appear before
1640.52
The demise of the old forms of trial brought with it the end of
the oath swearer, compurgator, and secta.53 With the separation of
witness and jury came the rejection of the interested witness. All
persons interested in a litigation were disqualified from testifying.5 4
Such disqualification was based on two assumptions: that an interested
witness tends to put a gloss on his testimony to make it most favorable
to himself and that if self-interest conflicts with truth, truth is unlikely
to prevail.55 Disqualification because of interest was viewed as a means
of preventing perjury.
In the 15th and 16th centuries this reasoning was of great import.
Because the old modes of trial had embraced the interested witness,
refinements in methods of proof and in the introduction of evidence
were virtually nonexistent. Thus at the time of their formulation, the
rules governing competence may have been well founded, but since
that time the rules of evidence have advanced. Four centuries of
change have made anachronistic the old rules governing competency.
II. THE DEAD MAN'S STATUTE: NOT ANCIENT HISTORY IN FLORIDA
Witness incompetence has long been recognized in Florida. In 1829,
Florida adopted the common law of England 6 and in doing so became
51. Id.
52. WiGMoRE § 575.
53. The secta was a complaint-witness and part of a formal system of proof. The
party who was to "go to the proof" produced his secta. The secta as a "witness" had
little to do with the trial; he only took part in the pleading. THAYER 10-13. "It was
the office of the secta to support the plaintiff's case in advance of any answer from the
defendant." Id. at 13.
54. WiGMoP, E § 576; see Jensen v. Lance, 88 So. 2d 762, 764 (Fla. 1956); Adams v.
Board of Trustees, 20 So. 266, 273 (Fla. 1896); Pollock v. Kelly, 125 So. 2d 109 (Fla.
1st Dist. Ct. App. 1960). See generally Brooker, The Decedent Comes to Court, 23 FIA.
L. J. 108 (1949); Ehrhardt, A Look At Florida's Proposed Code of Evidence, 2 FLA.
ST. U.L. REV. 681, 702 (1974); Note, Evidence; Legislative Reform for the "Dead Man's
Statute," 18 U. FLA. L. REv. 693 (1966).
55. GILBERT, EVIDENCE, 119 (Lofft's ed. 223):
[T1herefore, from the nature of human passions and actions, there is more reason to
distruct [sic] such a biased testimony than to believe it. It is also easy for persons,
who are prejudiced and prepossessed, to put false and unequal glosses upon
what they give in evidence; and therefore the law removes them from testimony,
to prevent their sliding into perjury ....
quoted in WIGMORE at § 576; P & N Investment Corp. v. Rea, 153 So. 2d 865, 867
(Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1965); Day v. Stickle, 113 So. 2d 559, 560 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct.
App. 1959).
56. Act of Nov. 6, 1829, AcTs OF THE LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL OF THE TERRITORY OF
FLORIDA 8-9 (1829). The most recent version provides:
The common and statute laws of England which are of a general and not a local
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heir to English rules governing witness incompetence. Under the
common law Florida denied the interested witness the right to testify
until 1866, when the legislature enacted the predecessor of Florida
Statutes sections 90.601 and 90.602. 57 Although this statute abrogated
the common law by providing that no person be disqualified from
testifying because of interest, it disqualified some witnesses whose testi-
mony involved the estates of deceased persons. The 1866 statute, unlike
section 90.05 and more recently sections 90.601 and 90.602, referred
only to contract actions involving an administrator or an executor.5
In 1870, this statute was repealed and replaced by a statute which con-
tained no provision for the protection of decedents' estates.59 But in
1874 such a provision-a Dead Man's Statute-was written back into the
law; 60 this proviso remained virtually unchanged until June 1976,
nature, with the exception hereinafter mentioned, down to the 4th day of July, 1776,
are declared to be of force in this state; provided, the said statutes and common law
be not inconsistent with the constitution and laws of the United States and the
acts of the legislature of this state.
FLA. STAT. § 2.01 (1975).
57. Law of January 16, 1865, ch. 1472, §§ 1-2, [1866] Fla. Laws 35-36 (repealed
1870) provided:
Section 1. Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
State of Florida in General Assembly convened, That in all civil cases now
depending, or that may hereafter be instituted in any of the courts of this
State, whether at law or in equity, the parties to the same shall not be disqualified
to testify as witnesses therein, either in his or their own favor or in favor of the
opposite party or parties when introduced as witness or witnesses by him or them,
and their relation to the cause or interest therein shall not operate against their
competency, but shall go only to their credibility, which shall be a matter for
the determination of the jury, or of the court, when the trial is not by jury.
Section 2. Be it further enacted, That either party may offer himself or them-
selves, or the adverse party, or both, as a witness or witnesses in the cause, or he,
she or they, thus offered, shall be competent to testify in the same manner as
if he, she or they were entirely disinterested in or disconnected therewith; saving
the question of credibility, to be determined by the jury or court, as the case
may be as aforesaid: Provided, That the provisions of this act shall not apply where
one of the parties is an executor or administrator, and the action is founded upon
a contract entered into by his testator or intestate; and in all such cases the
executor or administrator may offer the adverse party as a witness touching any
point in the case, and when so offered, the said adverse party may proceed to
testify in his own favor concerning all the facts involved.
58. Id. The 1866 statute, unlike sections 90.05 and more recently section 90.602,
referred only to contract actions involving an administrator or an executor. Id.
59. Law of June 1, 1870, ch. 1816, [1870] Fla. Laws 13 (Special Session):
The people of the State of Florida, represented in Senate and Assembly, do
enact as follows: In the courts of Florida there shall be no exclusion of any
witness in a civil action because he is a party to, or interested in, the issue tried.
In all the criminal prosecutions the party accused shall have the right of making
a statement to the jury, under oath, of the matter of his or her defense.
The Act entitled, "An Act concerning testimony approved January 16, 1866,"
is hereby repealed.
60. Law of February 14, 1874, ch. 1983, § 1, [1874] Fla. Laws 39:
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when the legislature enacted the Florida Evidence Code. 1 Prior to
the adoption of the new evidence code, any party or person interested
in the event of an action was disqualified from testifying about trans-
actions or communications with a person deceased, insane, or lunatic.62
The new evidence code, although expressly preserving the Dead Man's
Statute as an exception to the general rule of witness competence,
limits the application of the Dead Man's Statute to exclude the
testimony of an interested person only when it concerns oral communi-
cations with a person deceased or insane. 63 The Dead Man's Statute
has survived for over a century; it has been repealed, reenacted, and
revised. The 1976 revision of the Dead Man's Statute approaches
abandonment, the only remaining step in this proviso's evolution and
decline.
III. INTERPRETATION AND CONSTRUCTION OF THE DEAD MAN'S STATUTE
According to the canons of statutory construction, the Dead Man's
Statute should be narrowly construed. 64 Before disqualifying a witness
under this provision, a court should carefully examine the disqualifying
The people of the State of Florida, represented in Senate and Assembly, do
enact as follows: Section 1. No person offered as a witness in any court, or before
any officer acting judicially, shall be excluded by reason of his interest in the
event of the action or proceeding, or because he is a party thereto: Provided, how-
ever, That no party to such action or proceeding, nor any person interested in
the event thereof, nor any person from, through, or under whom any such
party or interested person desires any interest or title by assignment or otherwise,
shall be examined as a witness in regard to any transaction or communication
between such witness and the person at the time of such examination deceased,
insane, or lunatic against the executor, administrator, heir at law, next of kin,
assignee, legatee, devisee, or survivor of such insane person or the assignee or
committee of such insane person or lunatic ....
61. See note 7 supra.
62. See note 2 supra. Although this Note is primarily concerned with the protec-
tion afforded decedents' estates under the provisions of section 90.05, as a general
rule this discussion applies to estates of lunatic or insane persons as well.
63. See note 7 supra.
64. Provisos which restrict the general effect of a statute, or provisos which create
exceptions to the general rule of the statute, should be strictly construed. 2A D. SANDS,
STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONsTRucTION § 47.08 (4th ed. 1973) states:
Provisos, which serve the purpose of restricting the operative effect of other
statutory language to less than what its scope of operation would be otherwise,
are construed according to the same general criteria of decision as are applied
to other kinds of provisions. Where there is doubt, however, as to the extent
of the restriction imposed by a proviso on the scope of another provision's
operation, the proviso is strictly construed. The reason for this is that the
legislative purpose set forth in the main or dominant body of an enactment is
assumed to express the legislative policy, and only those subjects expressly
exempted by the proviso should be freed from the operation of the statute
(footnotes omitted).
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criteria. Such an examination will require a review of case law de-
veloped under section 90.05 until July 1977, when sections 90.601 and
90.602 become effective. 65 Even then, case law construing and applying
section 90.05 should, for the most part, remain valid, since this section
and the provisions of the new evidence code are similar.66
Under the provisions of section 90.05, a witness is disqualified from
testifying when that person: (1) is a party, interested person, person
from, through, or under whom a party or interested person took
interest; (2) is examined about a transaction or communication between
himself and the party now deceased; and (3) offers testimony against
the estate of the deceased.6 7 Under section 90.602, a witness will be
disqualified from testifying when that person: (1) is interested in an
action or proceeding; (2) is examined as a witness about any oral
communication between himself and the party now deceased; and
(3) offers testimony against the estate of the deceased.6 While there
are dissimilarities in the phrasing of these two sections, with the
exception noted below they are fundamentally the same.69
A Dead Man's Statute is primarily concerned with the disqualifica-
tion of the interested witness. Under the provisions of section 90.05
parties to an action are automatically deemed interested without in-
quiry into the nature of that interest.7 0 But persons other than parties
are treated differently; a nonparty is not disqualified absent a showing
of the requisite interest.7'1 Section 90.602, unlike section 90.05, does not
distinguish parties from other persons interested in an action against
the decedent's estate.7 2 The new section disqualifies all persons
interested in such actions. It thus appears that requisite interest is no
longer imputed to parties. It is difficult, however, to imagine a party
to an action who has no interest in that action; yet the fact remains
that parties are no longer treated as a separate group who automatically
possess disqualifying interest. Therefore, under 90.602, parties must
meet the same tests for interest as other persons.
In 1896, the Florida Supreme Court adopted the following test for
the determination of interest:
65. See Fla. Laws 1976, ch. 76-237.
66. Compare note 2 supra with note 7 supra.
67. See note 2 supra.
68. See note 7 supra.
69. See note 66 supra.
70. "[N]o party to such action or proceeding, nor any person interested in the
event . ." were allowed to testify. FiA. STAT. § 90.05 (1975). Parties and nonparties
obviously received separate treatments.
71. Id.
72. Section 90.602 does not distinguish any classes; it only mentions "[any] person
interested." See note 7 supra.
1976]
490 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol.4:480
The true test of the interest of a witness is that he will either gain
or lose by the direct legal operation and effect of the judgment,
or that the record will be legal evidence for or against him in some
other action. It must be a present, certain, and vested interest, and
not an interest uncertain, remote, or contingent. 73
Disqualification did not necessarily follow when this test was met.
Under section 90.05, there are two types of interest: disqualifying in-
terest in the event of an action, and nondisqualifying interest in the
question to be decided.74 A two-pronged test for the determination of
disqualifying interest exists: first, a nonparty witness has to be in-
terested in the event, rather than in the question; second, the non-
party witness must either gain or lose by the direct legal operation
of the judgment, or must meet the other criteria of the Florida Supreme
Court's definition of interest. An examination of Florida cases dealing
with the Dead Man's Statute under section 90.05 suggests that the
event/question distinction can be distilled into the following general
rule: interest in the event can be equated with pecuniary interest,
and interest in the question can be equated with nonpecuniary
interest.75
Madison v. RobinsonTM and Jensen v. Lance77 illustrate the event/
question, pecuniary/nonpecuniary dichotomy. In Madison, two parties
claiming title to a house as the sole heirs of Robin Robinson brought
an ejectment action against Francis Madison, who also claimed to be
Robinson's heir and the title holder of the house.7 8 Madison claimed
she was Robinson's legitimate daughter, which depended on the
validity of her mother's marriage to Robinson. When Madison placed
her mother on the stand to testify about the marriage, the plaintiffs
objected, contending that the witness was disqualified by the Dead
73. Adams v. Board of Trustees of Internal Improvement Fund, 20 So. 266, 273
(Fla. 1896), quoting S. GREENLEAF, THE LAw OF EVIDENCE § 390 (1842). This test has been
used extensively by Florida courts. See, e.g., Jensen v. Lance, 88 So. 2d 762 (Fla. 1956);
Madison v. Robinson, 116 So. 31 (Fla. 1928); Shoemaker v. Powers, 82 So. 751 (Fla.
1919); In re Lynagh's Estate, 177 So. 2d 256 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1965); Broward
Nat'l Bank v. Bear, 125 So. 2d 760 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1961); Leighton v. Harmon,
111 So. 2d 697 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1959).
74. See, e.g., Madison v. Robinson, 116 So. 31 (Fla. 1928); Adams v. Board of
Trustees, 20 So. 166 (Fla. 1896).
75. See note 73 supra. Disqualification because of interest has long been premised upon
the belief that "[p]ersons having a pecuniary interest in the event of the cause are
specially likely to speak falsely .... " WGMORE § 576. It appears that interest in the
event and pecuniary interest have historically been interchangeable concepts.
76. 116 So. 31 (Fla. 1928).
77. 88 So. 2d 762 (Fla. 1956).
78. 116 So. at 32.
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Man's Statute.79 The court held that the witness was competent to
testify because her interest was in the question to be decided and
not in the event of the action. 0 This holding was based on a deter-
mination that the witness would gain nothing from the outcome of an
action in ejectment. "But would the judgment in this ejectment suit
give or take away her dower? Would the record in this ejectment suit,
even if judgment went for the defendant, be legal evidence in her
favor on a proceeding for admeasurement of dower? Clearly not.",',
The court quite clearly determined that Mrs. Madison's interest was
in the question to be decided and not in the event, but its method for
arriving at this conclusion is unclear. A determination of the legal
effect of the judgment on Mrs. Madison does nothing to distinguish
her interest in the question from her possible interest in the event.
Mrs. Madison appears to have had no direct pecuniary stake in the
outcome of the litigation, and because her interest was nonpecuniary
it was classified as interest in the question, a nondisqualifying interest.8 2
In Jensen v. Lance,8 3 the court's decision to disqualify a witness
rested solely on pecuniary considerations." Mrs. Jensen had paid Lance
$10,000 to obtain a liquor license. In a separate transaction, her son
paid Lance $3,600 to obtain a lease on a building under construction."
Lance died without securing the liquor license or securing the lease;
Mrs. Jensen brought suit to recover the money she had paid him.
At trial, she sought to introduce her son's testimony to verify her
transaction with Lance. The court refused to allow the testimony al-
though it was clear that her son would neither gain nor lose by the
direct legal effect of the judgment. The court admitted that, "[i]n a
strict technical sense the witness was not directly interested in the
outcome of this particular suit . ,,"' But the court realized that if the
son were allowed to testify for the mother in this action, the mother
would then be allowed to testify for the son in another action.8 7 As
a result, they both had a good opportunity to recover, and each had
79. Id. at 32-33.
80. Id. at 35-36.
81. Id. at 35.
82. Id. at 38.
83. 88 So. 2d 762 (Fla. 1956).
84. There was no other interest involved; the son would neither gain nor lose
as a result of the action, and the trial record could not be introduced into evidence
against him in another action. Thus, the criteria set forth in section 90.05, Florida
Statutes do not appear to be met. But because he could testify for the mother, and
the mother could testify for him in another action, he was disqualified for pecuniary
interest.
85. 88 So. 2d at 763.
86. Id. at 764.
87. ld.
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a pecuniary interest in the litigation of the other. The court, on the
sole basis of pecuniary interest, disqualified Mrs. Jensen's son. It simply
equated pecuniary interest with interest in the event and took the
position that pecuniary interest, no matter how indirect, is sufficient
to disqualify a witness.
This confusion over interest in the event and interest in the ques-
tion apparently originated in the wording of section 90.05, which men-
tions interest "in the event" of an action. 8 Section 90.602 does not
utilize these words and may thus avoid perpetuation of the confusion
they caused. But section 90.602 does not differ significantly from 90.05
where interest is involved; the purpose of both sections is the dis-
qualification of the interested witness. As noted in Madison and in
Jensen, pecuniary interest is the key to disqualification under section
90.05; there is no indication that it will not continue to be an important,
if not the sole factor in disqualification under section 90.602. Although
the courts may no longer rely on the distinction between interest in
the event and interest in the question, the determining factor-
pecuniary interest-is likely to remain the same.
Interest alone does not disqualify a witness under section 90.05.
Under this provision an interested witness may testify about any
matter so long as it does not involve a transaction or a communication
with the decedent. 9 Any matter outside the definition of these terms
is unprotected by the Dead Man's Statute. In reality, very little is
unprotected since "[t]ransactions and communications embrace every
variety of affairs which can form the subject of negotiation, interviews
or actions between two persons, and include every method by which
one person can derive impressions or information from the conduct,
condition or language of another."9o Under this broad definition,
virtually any action of one person affecting the rights of another
constitutes a transaction. Oral and written communications, contracts,
loans, and the observation of handwriting 1 are all within this
definition. Almost all contact between an interested person and the
decedent is either a transaction or a communication and is excluded
88. See note 2 supra.
89. Id.
90. Holliday v. McKinne, 22 Fla. 153, 163 (1886), quoting Holcomb v. Holcomb,
95 N.Y. 316 (1884); see Knowles v. Boylston, 137 So. 6 (Fla. 1931); Chapin v. Mitchell,
32 So. 875 (Fla. 1902); Day v. Stickle, 113 So. 2d 559 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1959).
91. Jensen v. Lance, 88 So. 2d 762 (Fla. 1956) (oral agreement, or contract, to
obtain a liquor license); Pickard v. Miggins, 311 So. 2d 686 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1975)
(promissory note and loan); Howland v. Strahan, 219 So. 2d 472 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1969) (written inter vivos transfer); Matthews v. Matthews, 177 So. 2d 497 (Fla. 2d
Dist. Ct. App. 1965) (identification of handwriting from past observations is a trans-
action).
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from testimony. There is, however, one instance in which an interested
witness-party or nonparty-may testify about a transaction or com-
munication with the deceased. If the witness does not participate in
the transaction or the communication but is a bystander or an observer,
he may testify thereto.92 The reason for this exception is unclear; it
appears that the incentive to perjure exists whether the transaction or
communication is direct or indirect. Perhaps the distinction lies in the
possible corroboration by a disinterested third person in the case of
indirect transactions and communications. This rationale is, however,
unsatisfactory since it would be simpler to allow the third person,
rather than the interested person, to testify.93
Thus the scope of the Dead Man's Statute, under the provisions of
section 90.05, is virtually unlimited. The same cannot be said of
section 90.602. The Dead Man's Statute no longer encompasses trans-
actions, and the protection afforded communications has been limited
to oral communications. 4 The impact of the Dead Man's Statute has
been significantly reduced; it no longer embraces every action of one
person that affects the rights of another. It now includes only a small
portion of personal interaction-oral communications.
There is one final element which must be satisfied before a witness
may be disqualified under the Dead Man's Statute: the offensive testi-
mony must be offered against the estate of the deceased.9 5 The pro-
tection afforded the decedent's estate is not restricted to actions brought
against the estate; indeed, the protection attaches whether the
decedent's estate is party plaintiff or defendant. 96 The requirement here
is that the testimony itself be offered against the decedent's estate.
In this instance, the requirements of sections 90.05 and 90.602 are
similar. The protection of "the estate of the deceased" extends to the
personal representative, heir at law, assignee, legatee, devisee and the
92. Withers v. Sandlin, 32 So. 829 (Fla. 1902).
93. There were then two situations in which a party or interested person could
testify. The first occurred when the testimony concerned neither a transaction nor
a communication. Farley v. Collins, 146 So. 2d 366 (Fla. 1962), involved an automobile
accident in which the court held that automobile accidents did not constitute transactions.
Thus, the survivor of an automobile accident was allowed to testify against the
decedent's estate even though he was interested in the event of the action. The second
occurred when the witness testified about a transaction or communication in which
he did not participate. See Withers v. Sandlin, 32 So. 829 (Fla. 1902).
94. See note 7 supra.
95. See note 2 supra; McDougald v. Couey, 9 So. 2d 187 (Fla. 1942).
96. See, e.g., Jensen v. Lance, 88 So. 2d 762 (Fla. 1956) (action brought against
decedent's estate); Broward Nat'l. Bank v. Bear, 125 So. 2d 760 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
1961) (action brought by decedent's estate).
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survivor of the deceased.9 7 Parties not within this class find no protec-
tion under this proviso. 9
Parties protected by the Dead Man's Statute may waive their
protection in several ways: (1) if they testify on the subject; (2) if
they cross-examine the opposing party on the subject; or (3) if by
other conduct "evidenced in the record, [they] clearly indicat[e] that
they, knowing their rights under the statute, wished to waive the pro-
tection afforded thereby."99 Undoubtedly, when the party protected
by the statute testifies as to a transaction or communication with the
deceased, he thereby waives the protection of the statute as to that
transaction or communication; 100 the adverse party is then free to call
witnesses who would otherwise have been incompetent, 10' or to cross-
examine the protected party on the subject matter in question. 0 2 The
protected party may also waive his statutory protection on redirect by
going beyond the scope of direct or cross-examination or by failing to
object to such actions on the part of the adverse party. 0 3 The pro-
tected party also waives his statutory protection when he calls a witness
who is incompetent under the statute and questions him concerning
transactions or communications with the deceased' 0 4 thereby opening
the door to cross-examination by the opposing party. The protection
of the Dead Man's Statute is similarly waived when the protected
97. See notes 2, 7 supra.
98. FLA. STAT. § 90.05 (1975) specifically lists those parties for whom the protection
of the Dead Man's Statute was devised. Those persons falling outside this class are
not protected by this proviso. 2A D. SANDS, supra note 64 at § 47.23 (4th ed. 1973),
states, in his section dealing with the "expressio unius est exclusio alterius" rule of
statutory construction:
As the maxim is applied to statutory interpretation, where a form of conduct,
the manner of its performance and operation, and the persons and things to
which it refers are designated, there is an inference that all omissions should
be understood as exclusions . . .
The enumeration of exclusions from the operation of a statute indicates
that it should apply to all cases not specifically excluded. [Footnotes omitted.]
99. Doing v. Riley, 176 F.2d 449 (5th Cir. 1949); Rich v. Hunter, 185 So. 141, 146
(Fla. 1938).
100. E.g., Mayer v. Mayer, 54 So. 2d 105 (Fla. 1951); McMullen v. St. Lucie County
Bank, 175 So. 721 (Fla. 1937); Kings County Trust Co. v. Hyams, 152 N.E. 129 (N.Y.
1926); In re Cozine, 93 N.Y.S. 557 (App. Div. 1905); Hackstaff v. Hackstaff, 31 N.Y.S. 11
(Sup. Ct. 1894).
101. E.g., Mayer v. Mayer, 54 So. 2d 105, 106 (Fla. 1951); Macknet v. Rogers, 119
So. 2d 72 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1960).
102. McMullen v. St. Lucie County Bank, 175 So. 721. (Fla. 1937).
103. Sessions v. Summers, 177 So. 2d 720 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1965); Robinson
v. Miller, 296 So. 2d 58 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1974).'
104. Small v. Shure, 94 So. 2d 371 (Fla. 1957); Herring v. Eiland, 81 So. 2d 645
(Fla. 1955); Embrey v. Southern Gas & Elec. Corp., 63 So. 2d 258 (Fla. 1953); Josephson
v. Kuhner, 139 So. 2d 440 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1962).
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party develops testimony concerning a transaction or communication
with the deceased on cross-examination. 10 5
Cross-examination of a person incompetent to testify under the
Dead Man's Statute does not necessarily result in the waiver of its
protection. If a protected party objects to the testimony of an in-
competent witness and the objection is overruled, the protected party
may freely cross-examine on the subject without waiving the protection
of the Dead Man's Statute.'0 6 The protected party neither makes the
incompetent witness his own nor waives the Dead Man's Statute by
his cross-examination. 10 7 After the protected party's objection has been
overruled, it would be inequitable to require him to remain silent
and to forego cross-examination in order to assure the protection of
the Dead Man's Statute. 0 Under these circumstances, if an appeal
court finds the lower court erred in overruling the protected party's
objection, it should strike the testimony admitted contrary to the pro-
visions of the Dead Man's Statute.10 9
Clearly the failure of a protected party to object when the adverse
party introduces testimony concerning transactions or communications
with the deceased results in waiver of the protection of the statute. 10
Thus the protected party may waive the protection of the Dead Man's
Statute by either eliciting incompetent testimony himself-on either
direct, cross, or redirect-or by failing to object to the introduction of
such testimony when elicited by the adverse party.
Waiver of the protection of the Dead Man's Statute may occur as
early as a hearing for summary judgment. The taking of depositions
and admissions from a person incompetent to testify under the pro-
visions of the Dead Man's Statute does not waive its protection,"'
but the use of such depositions and admissions, either in support of or
in defense of a motion for summary judgment, will usually effect such
a waiver.1 2 The adverse party is then free to introduce all "relevant
105. In re Thompson's Estate, 199 So. 352 (Fla. 1940); Rich v. Hunter, 185 So.
141 (Fla. 1938); see Land v. Hart, 109 So. 2d 589 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1959).




110. Rich. v. Hunter, 185 So. 141 (Fla. 1938); Robinson v. Miller, 296 So. 2d 58
(Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1974); Sessions v. Summers, 177 So. 2d 720 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct.
App. 1965).
111. Small v. Shure, 94 So. 2d 371 (Fla. 1957); Booth v. Cureton, 81 So. 2d 662
(Fla. 1955); Herring v. Eiland, 81 So. 2d 645 (Fla. 1955); Bordacs v. Kimmel, 139 So.
2d 506 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1962).
112. Herring v. Eiland, 81 So. 2d 645 (Fla. 1955); Barber v. Adams, 208 So. 2d
869 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1968); Bordacs v. Kimmel, 139 So. 2d 506 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct.
App. 1962).
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and germane" parts of the deposition. 113 It is equally clear that a failure
by the protected party to object to the introduction of such depositions
and admissions by the adverse party will also result in waiver." 4 Further,
waiver of the Dead Man's Statute at the summary judgment level results
in its waiver on the same subject for all subsequent proceedings in the
same action. 1
5
IV. PROTECTION FOR THE DECEASED AT THE COST OF THE SURVIVOR
The Dead Man's Statute is objectionable for several reasons. First,
it is founded on faulty logic. The exclusion of an interested witness's
testimony is predicated on an eighteenth-century syllogism: "Total
exclusion from the stand is the proper safeguard against a false decision,
whenever the persons offered are of a class specially likely to speak
falsely; Persons having a pecuniary interest in the event of the cause
are specially likely to speak falsely; Therefore such persons should be
totally excluded."" 6 Neither of the premises of this syllogism is sound.
Interest does not always result in prevarication, and exclusion of testi-
mony does nothing to insure that a just decision will result. 1 7
Second, both honest and dishonest claims are eliminated. In
Broward National Bank v. Bear,"8 the executors of the decedent's
estate sued the makers of a promissory note, Bear and Kinsey, for
payment. The makers of the note admitted executing it but pleaded
the defense of payment. At trial the defendants were allowed to
admit into evidence, over plaintiff's objections, a cancelled check they
claimed to have delivered to the deceased as payment of the note.
The trial judge, who heard the cause without a jury, entered judgment
for the defendants; on appeal, the decision of the trial court was
reversed and the case remanded for a new trial. 1 9 By doing so, the
district court of appeal dismissed the Florida Supreme Court's state-
ment in Terwilligar v. Ballard12 that "[p]roofs of payment to a de-
ceased person may be made without violating the statutory or common-
law rules of evidence" as "merely dictum and . . . taken out of the
context of the case.' ' 12 ' Based on this reasoning, the court found that
113. Herring v. Eiland, 81 So. 2d 645, 648 (Fla. 1955).
114. Boling v. Barnes, 216 So. 2d 804 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1968); Bordacs v.
Kimmel, 139 So. 2d 506 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1962).
115. Id.
116. WIcMo, § 576.
117. Id.
118. 125 So. 2d 760 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1961).
119. Id. at 760.
120. 59 So. 244, 246 (Fla. 1912).
121. 125 So. 2d at 761.
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proof of payment-the defendants' check-was barred by the Dead
Man's Statute. 2 Thus this defense, which the trial court had found to
be meritorious and supported by ample credible evidence, could not
be considered. The Dead Man's Statute offers no mechanism for dis-
tinguishing between honest and dishonest claims.
Finally, the Dead Man's Statute is objectionable because it is too
easily misapplied. In Pickard v. Miggins,'1 2 an action was brought to
recover on a promissory note made by Rod Pickard and delivered to
the decedent Polonko. At the trial, Pickard contended that he gave
a check to Luis Salis, who was to cash the check and pay Polonko. Salis
testified he cashed Pickard's check and paid Polonko but failed to
obtain a receipt therefor. After hearing the testimony, the jury found
for Pickard. The court set the verdict aside, finding that it lacked
competent evidentiary support. 24 Pickard was disqualified from testify-
ing under the Dead Man's Statute since he was a party to an action in
which he attempted to testify against a decedent's estate concerning a
transaction with the decedent. It is unclear, however, why the court
disqualified Salis or failed to find support in his testimony for the
jury's verdict. The appellate court agreed with the trial court's finding
that Salis was interested but stated no reasons for its concurrence.1 25
Salis was not a party, and he does not appear to satisfy the criterion
of an interested person: he had no pecuniary interest in the litigation.
Although Salis' testimony was sufficiently credible to support a finding
by the jury in Pickard's favor, it was nevertheless found insufficient
by the trial judge. While the decision in this case may have been
equitable, the extension of the Dead Man's Statute to embrace a situa-
tion clearly not within its scope is undesirable. The Dead Man's
Statute should not be relied upon in any event to give an advantage
to the decedent's estate. The evidence presented by both parties should
be admitted and given consideration based on its credibility and pro-
bative value.
V. ALTERNATIVES TO THE DEAD MAN'S STATUTE
There is ample reason for discontent with the Dead Man's Statute.
The statute is aimed at eliminating false claims against decedent's
estates, yet it eliminates honest claims as well.1 26 It assumes interested
122. Id. at 762.
123. 311 So. 2d 686 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1975).
124. Id. at 688.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 687. Brooker, Let's Repeal the Dead Man Act, 38 FLA. B.J. 181 (1964);
Ehrdardt, supra note 54, at 703.
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survivors will perjure themselves to the detriment of decedents' estates.
Perhaps most importantly, the Dead Man's Statute is easily misapplied.
In its effort to protect the decedent's estate, the Dead Man's Statute
overlooks both modern discovery methods and cross-examination.
Discovery procedures tend to equalize the positions of litigants.11
7
The surviving party can look to the decedent's records and documents
to corroborate testimony.128 The decedent's estate may avail itself of
the same discovery tools in an effort to defend against the survivor's
claims. Cross-examination is a valuable tool not only for testing the
credibility of a witness, but also for determining the truthfulness of
his testimony. 29
The establishment of truth is best facilitated by the inclusion of
all relevant evidence. Under the Dead Man's Statute, the competency
of a witness is a question of law to be decided by the court."30 The
court determines whether or not the witness meets the criteria of the
Dead Man's Statute and consequently whether or not the witness is
competent to testify. If the Dead Man's Statute were to be abolished,
the witness would testify and the jury would determine the veracity of
the evidence as a question of fact. 1"1 If a jury can determine the truthful-
ness of testimony in litigation between two living parties, it can make
the same determination where only one party survives.
As discussed above, Florida has adopted, in section 90.602 of the
Florida Statutes, one of several alternatives to the Dead Man's Statute;1 2
there are, however, other alternatives which facilitate the introduction
of all relevant evidence. The best of these is repeal of the Dead Man's
Statute, completely abolishing incompetence by reason of interest. 33
Any advantage bestowed upon the survivor by repeal could be counter-
127. Note, 18 U. FLA. L. REV. 693 (1966).
128. FLORIDA CIVIL PRACrICE BEFORE TRIAL § 16.19 provides:
Subject to the orders of the court for protection of the parties upon a showing
of good cause and subject to the provisions of RCP 1.310(b), an adverse party may be
required to produce and permit the inspection and copying or photographing of
certain documents, papers, books, accounts, letters, photographs, objects or
tangible things, RCP 1.350. The item must not be privileged and must constitute
or contain evidence relating to a matter within the scope of examination per-
mitted by RCP 1.280.
129. WIGMORE § 1395.
130. See Note, supra note 127, at 697.
131. id.
132. Under FLA. STAT. § 90.602 (Supp. 1976), only oral communications are excluded
from testimony. This alleviates half the problem by allowing testimony on transactions. See
note 7 supra.
133. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-145 (1958) provides: "Interested witness not
disqualified; credibility-No person shall be disqualified as a witness in any action by
reason of his interest in the event of the same as a party or otherwise .... "
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acted by the enactment of a statutory exception to the hearsay rule
allowing the decedent's estate to introduce declarations made by the
party now deceased.'" This possibility is attractive since it allows
all relevant evidence to be introduced for consideration by the jury.
A second possibility is modification of the Dead Man's Statute to
allow the surviving party to testify if he is able to produce corroborating
testimony or evidence.135 This choice is less attractive than repeal
134. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-172 (1958) provides:
In actions by or against the representatives of deceased persons, and by or
against the beneficiaries of any life or accident insurance policy insuring a
person who is deceased at the time of the trial, the entries, memoranda and
declarations of the deceased, relevant to the matter in issue, may be received
as evidence. In actions by or against the representatives of deceased persons,
in which any trustee or receiver is an adverse party, the testimony of the
deceased, relevant to the matter in issue, given at his examination, upon the
application of such trustee or receiver, shall be received in evidence.
New Hampshire has a similar provision; it is, however, predicated on a finding by
the court that the deceased had actually made the statement in question. N.H.
REy. STAT. ANN. § 516:25 (1974) provides:
Declarations of Deceased Persons. In actions, suits or proceedings by or against
the representatives of deceased persons, including proceedings for the probate of
wills, any statement of the deceased, whether oral or written, shall not be
excluded as hearsay provided that the trial judge shall first find as a fact that
the statement was made by decedent, and that it was made in good faith and on
decedent's personal knowledge.
Oregon has another modification of the hearsay exception type rule to the Dead
Man's Statute which permits the admission of hearsay declarations made by the deceased
when the survivor has testified. ORE. Rav. STAT. § 41.850 (1975):
The declaration, act or omission of a deceased person, having sufficient knowledge
of the subject, against his pecuniary interest, is admissible as evidence to that
extent against his successor in interest. When a party to an action, suit or
proceeding by or against an executor or administrator appears as a witness in
his own behalf, or offers evidence of statements made by deceased against the
interest of the deceased, statements of the deceased concerning the same matter
in his own favor may also be proven.
135. N.M. STAT. ANN. ch. 20-2-5 (1953), repealed, N.M. Laws ch. 223 § 2 (1973)
provided:
Transactions with decedent-Corroboration required.-In a suit by or against
the heirs, executors, administrators or assigns of a deceased person, a claimant,
interested or opposite party shall not obtain a judgment or decision on his
own evidence, in respect of any matter occurring before the death of the
deceased person, unless such evidence is supported by some other material evidence
tending to corroborate the claimant or interested person.
VA. CODE ANN. § 8-286 (1950) provides:
Corroboration required and evidence receivable when one party incapable of
testifying.-In an action or suit by or against a person who, from any cause, is
incapable of testifying, or by or against the committee, trustee, executor,
administrator, heir, or other representative of the person so incapable of
testifying, no judgment or decree shall be rendered in favor of an adverse or
interested party founded on his uncorroborated testimony; and in any such action
or suit, if such adverse party testifies, all entries, memoranda, and declarations
by the party so incapable of testifying made while he was capable, relevant to
the matter in issue, may be received as evidence.
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because it assumes that uncorroborated testimony is false.136 It is,
however, superior to total exclusion of such evidence under the Dead
Man's Statute. A third choice is the exclusion of the interested person's
testimony unless injustice will result.137 The practical problem pre-
sented by this alternative is that "injustice" must be determined sub-
jectively by the court. Therefore the most attractive alternative to the
Dead Man's Statute appears to be repeal rather than modification.
Though Florida has opted for a modification that allows survivors
to testify about transactions, the federal courts have taken the preferred
choice and abandoned the Dead Man's Statute.
VI. FEDERAL COURTS AND TIHE DEAD MAN'S STATUTE
Prior to the enactment of the Federal Rules of Evidence, no uni-
form body of evidentiary rules for federal courts existed. 38 On January
136. In Bujac v. Wilson, 196 P. 327 (N.M. 1921), the New Mexico Supreme
Court recognized that the valid claim of the party was barred because he could not
corroborate it.
137. Aiz. Rxv. STAT. ANN. § 12-2251 (1956) provides:
In an action by or against executors, administrators or guardians in which
judgment may be given for or against them as such, neither party shall be
allowed to testify against the other as to any transaction with or statement by
the testator, intestate or ward unless called to testify thereto by the opposite
party, or required to testify thereto by the court. The provisions of this section
shall extend to and include all actions by or against the heirs, devisees,
legatees or legal representatives of a decedent arising out of any transaction with
the decedent.
MONT. REV. CODEs ANN. § 93-701-3.3 (1947) provides:
Persons who cannot be witnesses.-Parties or assignors of parties to an action
or proceeding, or persons in whose behalf an action or proceeding is prosecuted
against an executor or administrator upon a claim or demand against the estate
of a deceased person, as to the facts of direct transactions or oral communications
between the proposed witness and the deceased, excepting when the executor
or administrator first introduces evidence thereof, or when it appears to the
court that, without the testimony of the witness, injustice will be done.
138. See Preliminary Study of the Advisability and Feasibility of Developing Uni-
form Rules of Evidence for the Federal Courts, 30 F.R.D. 79, 81, 114 (1961); Rothstein,
The Proposed Amendments To The Federal Rules of Evidence, 62 GEO. L.J. 125, 126
n.8 (1973).
Congress authorizes the Supreme Court to promulgate rules of court. 18 U.S.C.
§ 3402 (1970) provides: "The Supreme Court shall prescribe rules of procedure and
practice for the trial of cases before magistrates and for taking and hearing of appeals
to the judges of the district courts of the United States." For other enabling acts
see, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3771 (1970) (power to prescribe rules in criminal cases); 28 US.C.
§ 2072 (1970) (power to prescribe rules in civil actions, admiralty and maritime cases);
28 U.S.C. § 2075 (1970) (power to prescribe rules under the Bankruptcy Act).
These statutes which enable the Supreme Court to issue rules governing procedure
have been construed as granting the authority to issue rules of evidence. See Preliminary
Study, supra, at 73, 101.
In 1965, the Advisory Committee on the Rules of Evidence was appointed at the
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2, 1975, Congress approved the Federal Rules of Evidence for United
States Courts and Magistrates.'"9 Federal Rule of Evidence 601 made
"[e]very person . . . competent to be a witness except as otherwise
provided in these rules.."140 The rules do not provide an exception for
the exclusion of witnesses based on interest.
There may, however, be occasions when a Dead Man's Statute
is recognized in federal courts. When the proposed rules were
submitted to Congress, no provision was made for the inclusion of a
federal Dead Man's Statute.' 1  The Advisory Committee14 2 on the
Rules of Evidence clearly desired the omission of the Dead Man's
Statute from the federal rules, but both the House of Representatives
and the Senate believed that some such provision was necessary. 4 3 The
direction of the Judicial Conference of the United States. 1965 Reports of the Pro-
ceedings of the Judicial Conference of the United States 54; See also Preliminary Study,
supra, at 73, 75; Rothstein, supra, at 125 n.3.
The Judicial Conference of the United States obtains its power to appoint such a
committee from 28 U.S.C. § 331 (1970):
The Conference shall also carry on a continuous study of the operation and
effect of the general rules of practice and procedure now or hereafter in use as
prescribed by the Supreme Court for the other courts of the United States
pursuant to law. Such changes in and additions to those rules as the Conference
may deem desirable to promote simplicity in procedure, fairness in administration,
the just determination of litigation, and the elimination of unjustifiable expense
and delay shall be recommended by the Conference from time to time to the
Supreme Court for its consideration and adoption, modification or rejection, in
accordance with law.
The Chief Justice shall submit to Congress an annual report of the proceedings
of the Judicial Conference and its recommendations for legislation.
Over a period of 7 years, this committee circulated at least two drafts of the
proposed rules. Preliminary Draft of Proposed Rules of Evidence for the United States
District Courts and Magistrates, 46 F.R.D. 161 (1969); Revised Draft of Proposed Rules
of Evidence for the United States Courts and Magistrates, 51 F.R.D. 315 (1971).
In November 1972, the Supreme Court approved a set of uniform evidence rules
to be used in federal courts. Rules of Evidence for United States Courts and
Magistrates, Amendments to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Amendments to
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 56 F.R.D. 183 (1972). Both houses of Congress
recommended amendments to these proposals. 4 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 7055, 7078
(1974). For the most part, the House amendments were adopted by conference
committee. Id. at 7098. This was the case with respect to rules 501 (privilege) and
601 (competence). Id. at 7100-101.
139. Act of Jan. 2, 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-595, 88 Stat. 1926 (codified at 28 U.S.C.,
Appendix at 1954 (Supp. IV, 1974)). Although approved Jan. 2, 1975, the rules
did not take effect until the 180th day after their enactment. Id.
140. FED. R. EVID. 601.
141. See FED. R. EVID. 602, 605, 606. These are the only exceptions to rule 601:
those who lack knowledge, judges, and jurors.
142. The Advisory Committee was appointed by the Judicial Conference of the
United States to promulgate federal rules of evidence. See note 138 supra.
143. In civil actions and proceedings, the House bill provides that state competency
law applies "to an element of a claim or defense as to which State law supplies
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House Committee on the Judiciary felt that "where such statutes have
been enacted they represent State policy which should not be over-
turned in the absence of a compelling federal interest .... -144 The
committee proposed an amendment which later became part of rule
601: "Every person is competent to be a witness except as otherwise
provided in these rules. However, in civil actions and proceedings, with
respect to an element of a claim or defense as to which State law
supplies the rule of decision, the competency of a witness shall be
determined in accordance with State law." '14 5
The Senate Committee on the Judiciary predicted "considerable
litigation" concerning what constitutes "an element of a claim or a
defense."'14 6 Because of these concerns the Senate committee proposed
its own amendment, which was eventually rejected in favor of the
House recommendation. 14 7
According to the Conference Report, in which the House amend-
ment was adopted, in nondiversity-jurisdiction civil cases federal
competency law will apply. In diversity cases state law will generally
apply.148 When a federal court adopts or incorporates state law to fill
gaps in federal statutory provisions, federal competency law will
apply, 149 but where state law supplies the rule of decision as to a
claim or element of a defense, state competency law must be applied.150
As evidenced by the Senate Committee's concerns, rule 601 will entail
some confusion as to when state competency law is to be applied in a
federal court. In practice, then, the Dead Man's Statute has not seen its
last day in federal court.
Regardless of the necessity for applying state law in federal courts,
the elimination of the Dead Man's Statute from the Federal Rules of
Evidence is commendable. Its elimination recognizes the desirability
the rule of- decision." The Senate bill provides that "in civil actions and pro-
ceedings arising under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 or 28 U.S.C. § 1335, or between citizens
of different States and removed under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) the competency
of a witness, person, government, State or political subdivision thereof is
determined in accordance with State law, unless with respect to the particular
claim or defense, Federal law supplies the rule of decision."
Conference Report, 4 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 7101 (1974).
144. Report of the House Committee on Judiciary, 4 U.S. CODE CONG & AD. NEWS
7075, 7083.
145. FED. R. Evm. 601.
146. 4 U.S. CODE CONG & AD. NEWS 7058 (1974). The Senate Committee on Judiciary
treated rule 601 as it did rule 501 on privilege, and for discussing the committee's
comments, rule 501 must be considered. Id. at 7059.
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of subjecting all relevant evidence to the scrutiny of the jury and the
court.
CONCLUSION
Disqualification based on interest has been a part of Florida's
law for over a century and a half. 151 Initially, all interested witnesses
were incompetent to testify,15 2 but eventually this class was narrowed
to include only those interested in the event of an action against the
estate of a deceased person.'5" In this instance, the fear of perjury was
the greatest; the word of the survivor was uncontested, and testimony
was suppressed to achieve equality.
In 1976, the Florida Legislature further narrowed the scope of
the Dead Man's Statute to include only those who wished to testify
about oral communications with a person now deceased.-M This action
not only indicates that modem discovery techniques and cross-
examination have diminished the fear of perjury where transactions
are involved, but it also acknowledges the inadequacy of those tools in
preventing perjury concerning oral communications. The modifica-
tion, rather than the abolition, of the Dead Man's Statute admits
an inability of judge and jury to determine witness truthfulness.
Through a conservative respect for tradition, the legislature has given
the estates of the dead an advantage not enjoyed by the living.
The adoption of the Florida Evidence Code has alleviated some
of the injustices of the Dead Man's Statute under section 90.05. But
many changes have occurred since the initial appearance of witness
incompetence and the Dead Man's Statute; trials have changed, juries
have changed, and the rules of evidence have changed. The Dead Man's
Statute is no longer a necessity in any form; it should be abandoned.
LINDA JONES WELLS
151. See note 56 supra.
152. See text accompanying note 56 supra.
153. See note 57 supra.
154. See note 7 supra.
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